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MISCONDUCT OF JURY-GROUND FOR
NEW TRIAL
By WILLIAM E. DOYLE, of the Denver Bar

ERY recently our Supreme Court announced a most
interesting and instructive decision. The case was that
of Wharton v. People, 90 Pac. (2d) 615, 103 Colo.
(May 8, 1939).
Wharton was convicted of murder in the first degree in
the District Court of El Paso county. He was sentenced to
death. Following the verdict a motion for a new trial was
filed. Contained therein was the affidavit of a juror who had
served on the trial of the case. This affidavit set forth that
the juror had concurred in the verdict only by reason of threats
and coercion at the hands of the other jurors. The district
attorney objected to the reception and consideration of this
affidavit, and the court sustained the objection. On appeal
the Supreme Court held that prejudicial error was committed
by the trial court in its refusal to receive and consider the
evidence.
The substance of the affidavit above mentioned is as follows: That the verdict was not that of the juror; that he had
been coerced into signing the death penalty verdict by abusive
language, threats, scoffing and slurring remarks and argumentative pressure until "after hours of the above repeated
and continuous violent, abusive and profane language and
conduct on the part of the said other eleven jurors to affiant,
affiant became so weak and exhausted as to be unable to speak
or argue without breaking down physically and crying, and
affiant was made to continuously withstand the repeated
assaults, pressure and conduct of the other jurors in the jury
room, and the threats to physical combat made by the other
eleven purported jurors, and affiant because of his weakened
physical condition and the long repeated pressure of . .
abusive epithets and conduct . . . told said other eleven purported jurors that affiant would let the penalty be entered on
the verdict that the other eleven purported jurors wished."
It is noteworthy that the language contained in the affidavit is very strong. It charges that the verdict was not unanimous, but rather that it was rendered by only eleven of the
twelve jurors. It should be noted also that the case is criminal
and involves the death penalty.
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Our Supreme Court, per Mr. Justice Bock, held that the
circumstances of the case were such as to "warrant a departure
from the general rule." Language used is as follows (p. 618
of 90 Pac. 2nd) :
"In the instant case the trial court's action in denying a hearing on
the question raised by the Anderson affidavit was arbitrary, and its failure
to hear and determine the matter, in view of the allegations hereinabove
quoted from said affidavit, was prejudicial error."

The rule which prohibits a juror's impeachment of his
own verdict is very old. Prior to 1785 a juror's testimony in
such cases was sometimes received. But in that year Lord
Mansfield, in Vaise v. DeLaval, 1 T. R. 11, refused to receive
the affidavits of jurors to prove that their verdict had been
made by lot. That ruling came to be universally recognized
in both England and the United States.' Also, it has been
broadened to include all affidavits of jurors. In many states
the rule has been codified into statutes.2 The rule is based
upon reasons of policy. As was said by the United States
Supreme Court in McDonald v. Pless, considering the question. "For while it may often exclude the only possible evidence of misconduct, a change in the rule would open the door
to the most pernicious arts and tampering with jurors. 'The
practice would be replete with dangerous consequences.' 'It
would lead to the grossest fraud and abuse,' and 'no verdict
would be safe.' Cluggage v. Swan, 4 Binn. 155, 5 Am. Dec.
400; Straker v. Graham, 4 Mees 1&W. 721, 7 Dowe P. E.
223, 1 Horn 1&H. 449, 8 L. J. Ech. N. S. 86."
It would seem that on grounds of policy the soundness
of the rule is beyond question; however, from the standpoint
of legal soundness it has often been sharply criticized. (See
Wigmore, Secs. 2348-2354.)
If we concede that criminal cases involving the death penalty are distinctive with regard to this question, and if we
are cognizant also that the reasons for the rule are reasons of
policy, then we will conclude that the Wharton case is not a
'There are now only six states in the United States that do not adhere to it. See
Wigmore, Sec. 2354.
'The Colorado statute modified the common law rule as follows (Sec. 237, Ch. 17,
Code of Civil Procedure, Part 2) : "Second-Misconduct of the jury, and when any
one or more of the jurors shall have been induced to assent to any general or special
verdict, or to a finding on any question or questions submitted to them by the court,
by a resort to the determination of chance, such misconduct may be proved by the
affidavits of one or more of the jurors."
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wide departure from established practice. Moreover, it is to
be remembered that exceptions to the rule are not impossible
when the reasons of policy suggest exceptions rather than no
exceptions.
(See Boyles v. People, 90 Colo. 32, 6 Pac.
7.)3
(2d)
The situation which occurred in the Wharton case will
probably never arise again. If a juror's affidavit is filed under
identical circumstances the trial court will most likely receive
it, hear evidence on the other side of the question, and make a
finding, which finding will probably not be disturbed on
appeal. Had the trial court in the Wharton case afforded a
hearing and exercised discretion, the case would not have been
sent back.
Finally, it is submitted that rules should not be blindly
worshipped. An exception should be made without equivocation where, as in the Wharton case, plain principles of reason
and justice dictate such an action. I believe that the decision
is sound.
Since the above was prepared a new trial has been granted.
A hearing was had in accordance with the ruling laid down
by the Supreme Court. At this hearing it appeared for the
first time that there were irregularities other than the alleged
coercion, which consisted of the failure on the part of the
bailiff to properly confine and watch the jury. The defendant
then filed a supplemental motion for a new trial, setting forth
in substance that the bailiff had left the jury unattended during the night of September 30, 1938; that they had access to
the whole third floor of the county courthouse; that a telephone was available to the jury.
The court found that there had not been coercion of juror
Anderson "and no improper conduct upon the part of any
member of the jury." The irregularities being the fault of
officers of the court, the court felt that a very liberal view
should be taken in the matter of granting the defendant a new
trial.
'In the Boyles case the Court, per Mr. Justice Butler, said: "It states the rule too
broadly to say that such affidavits are never admissible to impeach a verdict in a criminal
case. In the Wray case, supra, we stated that it is the general rule. It would not be
safe to lay down any inflexible rule, for, as was said by Mr. Justice Taney in United
States v. Reid, 53 U. S. (12 How.) 361, 366, 13 L. Ed. 1023, 'Cases might arise
in which it would be impossible to refuse them (such affidavits) without violating the
plainest principles of justice.' "

